With regard to the locutionary act, Austin claims that in order for there to be a speech act certain noises must be produced by the human voice: “to say anything is always to perform the act of uttering certain noises, and the utterance is a phone” [HDTW, 92]. This is obviously untrue, since one can say something by means of writing, the production of graphemes The Discussion On The Theory Of Speech Acts Of Austin: Posted on Degree:Master Type:Thesis Country:China Candidate:J P Yan Full Text:PDF GTID Subject:Foreign philosophy Abstract/Summary: PDF Full Text Request Speech Act Theory is a concept premised on the notion that an utterance has a definite function, meaning or purpose, for example, to suggest, to advise, to complain; and that these functions are expressible in established structural codes. Implicit in this notion is the assertion that there is a correlation between
Deconstruction and Speech Act Theory - Austin, Derrida, Searle - by Kevin Halion
In this dissertation I examine a distinction made in Speech Act Theory between normal uses of language and uses of language that are said to be parasitic on them.
Fictional, theatrical, comedic and metaphoric uses of language may be said to be parasitic on normal language in so far as their intelligibility requires a prior grasp of the rules or conventions of normal language such as is used in everyday cases of asserting, promising, act austin speech thesis, marrying and ordering, for instance.
Jacques Derrida argued that uses of language could not be determined as exclusively either normal or parasitic and that thus such a distinction could not be made. That is, he argued that it was not possible to make a distinction between fictional promises and real life promises, for instance; or between literal uses of words and metaphorical uses.
I show that the distinction can be made and that, although uses of language cannot be determined as exclusively either normal or parasitic in the work of J. Austin, they can be in that of John R.
I should like to thank my supervisor, Barry Allen, for the considerable effort he put into getting me to turn out a defensible dissertation. His comments were always penetrating and stimulating, and he worked through my drafts with lightening speed. My second reader, Donald Stewart, commented on all my drafts which is much more than one can expect from a second reader and his criticisms were always fair and brought many new considerations to my attention.
His constant and good-humoured insistence on clarity of presentation helped me turn my chaotic first draft into a considerably better organized final draft, act austin speech thesis.
Mark Vorobej, who was kind enough to show an interest in my thesis from the earliest stages, came to the rescue when a former third reader felt unable to continue. I am very grateful to Dr. Vorobej for working so hard on the penultimate draft of this dissertation and under such pressing circumstances. Besides those on my supervisory committee, others have helped me focus my ideas by discussing various aspect of Speech Act Theory and Deconstruction with me.
They include Stephen Liem, Sajahan Miah and Douglas Odegard. I should also like to thank Evan Simpson for his interest in my work and for his valuable help with administrative matters, act austin speech thesis. And I thank Christopher Tindale for sharing some work of his own with me. There are many others I perhaps ought to thank for their challenging scepticism, especially regarding Deconstruction: in this context I must mention my friend, Vincent Ngan.
For bibliographic details, act austin speech thesis, click act austin speech thesis the abbreviations. Clicking on the green endnote numbers e. Act austin speech thesis [0] brings you to the relevant endnote; once there you can click again to get back to where you were. Try this one by clicking on the green nought!
In this dissertation I examine, and defend in a certain form, the drawing of a distinction between normal uses of language and uses that are said to be parasitic on them. This distinction is made in the philosophies of J.
Austin and John R. It was attacked by Jacques Derrida. The distinction is first introduced by Austin in work of his most notably his How to Do Things with Words in which he attempts to see language as a kind of social activity rather than merely as a matter of stating truly or falsely.
Austin showed how language may be used to make promises or declarations as well as assertionsto baptize or to marry, to bet or to express emotion. He also showed how such acts might fail.
He called their failure, their being unhappy or infelicitous. Also he felt that these acts could be parasited. By this he meant that they could be used in novels, poems, act austin speech thesis, jokes, on stage and even in quotations.
There was something the matter with such parasitic uses which, Austin thought, was related to unhappiness. Distinctions between uses of language that are happy or unhappy, and normal or parasitic, are also made by Searle in his theory specifically in Speech ActsExpression and Meaning and Intentionality.
I shall show that the Searlean way is better. In other words, I shall argue that a distinction between normal speech acts and their parasites can be defended in the work of Searle but not in the work of Austin. By way of further introducing the topic of this dissertation I shall present a characterization of the basic issues to be dealt with. To distinguish between normal and parasitic language is to distinguish between uses of language that are primary and other uses that are in various ways dependant on them or derived from them.
This in turn presupposes that language is like an instrument which, although it may have proper functions, may be used for others too. As such, it may be likened to a feather duster made to dust around fragile objects and in awkward corners. The properties of the duster however allow it to be used to tickle.
Here dusting is the primary use and tickling is secondary. If language is characterized in some such way, then this implies that language has proper functions, and that it can be intentionally used according to its functions or in secondary ways. The normal, serious, primary purpose of language will be intentionally to perform certain conventional acts such as asserting or promising, for instance. Other uses will be secondary.
Uses that are not necessarily primarily concerned act austin speech thesis the performance of conventional social activities include joking, writing poems and novels and teaching languages. For instance, in joking the point is to amuse. So if something is asserted or promised that will be a secondary consideration. Thus a act austin speech thesis function of language is made secondary and vice-versa. Similarly in writing poetry, the assertions and declarations involved will be secondary to the aesthetic use of language.
And in teaching a language, phrases of the language will not be used at least not initially to perform any conventional social activity but for pronunciation exercises, tests of comprehension and translation. In one sense, a parasitic use of language is not a failed use.
One can distinguish between normal uses of a language such as asserting, promising or commanding and the various failed attempts at these uses. One might, of course, issue such a command as a joke. To distinguish between normal and parasitic uses of language is not per se to distinguish between successful and failed uses. A parasitic use of language is not a mistaken use but rather is quite deliberate or at least it may be so.
We shall see however that, for Austin, they may be related. It is important to be able to make distinctions between the happy and the unhappy and between the normal and the parasitic because without these distinctions Speech Act Theory would not be possible, act austin speech thesis.
This is because a promise that could not be determined as serious or literal could not be essentially characterized just as one could not define what a duster was unless one could distinguish between its primary function and its secondary functions which may not be enumerable.
One would not be able to say act austin speech thesis in one case certain rules were in operation but that some of them were suspended in the latter case because of the nature of the context or because certain conventions were being invoked. Uses of language cannot be unhappy or parasitic independently of their total context, act austin speech thesis.
These utterances will have contexts that are proper act austin speech thesis them e. Indeed such differences seem to be textual and contextual. It does this, as we shall see, by allowing that there act austin speech thesis be no textual or contextual mark of the speech act in question act austin speech thesis would be observable by any hearer or reader. Take some line of poetry and consider whether there is anything about it that tells whether it is a line of poetry or perhaps a mistaken use of language.
Sometimes it may appear to be obvious that it is poetry if the line is evidence of much skill, for instance. But at other times it will not be clear and one will according to Austin have to consider context.
One could check, for instance, whether it was published in a book of poetry. Those learning English sometimes come up with rather interesting utterances that might in other contexts be taken as poetry. For instance, they might come up with utterances that might seem to be complicated metaphors, rather than simply mistakes, were it not clear that the context in question was a person beginning to learn a language.
For Searle, the only act austin speech thesis of deciding whether such an utterance was intended metaphorically would be by discovering in whatever manner that the speaker or writer intended it metaphorically.
There might be no textual or act austin speech thesis mark of it. In this dissertation I examine how such distinctions and presuppositions are expounded in the speech act theories of Austin and Searle. I examine the reasons for such distinctions, their feasibility and whether they stand up to close critical examination by Derrida.
His examination of the type of framework in which such distinctions are made forces one to reconsider the basics of Speech Act Theory. And it is because of this that there can be no nice discrimination of the serious from the non-serious, or linguistic hosts from their parasites in his theory. It no longer becomes possible to distinguish the normal from the parasitic except relatively or perspectivally, act austin speech thesis.
I proceed as follows. I emphasize what he says about meaning, intentionality and context in order to clarify his understanding of the nature of language. Act austin speech thesis the normal speech act would seem sometimes to be a parasite. Act austin speech thesis shall show how it enables him to explain how one utterance can function in many different ways, act austin speech thesis.
For instance, one utterance can be made as an assertion of a philosophical point, an indirect contradiction of a point made by someone else, act austin speech thesis, and as a joke. But first I outline a basic concept in his philosophy which he uses in his criticism of Austin and Searle.
It is basically the notion of sameness in spite of difference; and it is intended to explain how things that are very different e. He sees his investigation as showing that this putative foundation and the attempted exclusion of the parasitic, act austin speech thesis, are arbitrary and, act austin speech thesis, in fact, impossible. He affirms the permanent, structural possibility of parasitism and, as a consequence, the impossibility of Austinian and Searlean Speech Act Theory, act austin speech thesis.
I show however that his investigation does not compel one to agree that Speech Act Theory, act austin speech thesis, as such, is impossible but only that it needs to be revised. Indeed I show that Speech Act Theory survives in Searle. More than this though, his theory is able to account for insights that Derrida has while including them in a theory that accounts for the uses of language in a systematic way.
In this chapter I shall show what a speech act is and how it may be either happy or unhappy. In order to do this efficiently I must approach the matter systematically. I begin therefore by explaining how the speech act emerges from a synthesis of what are known as constatives and performatives.
When I say that the two must be synthesized, I am essentially just saying that what was once seen as evidence of two different things is now seen as evidence of one thing with two dimensions or general characteristics. Since there are two main theories of act austin speech thesis acts, and since they differ act austin speech thesis on the matter of serious and parasitic speech acts, in what follows I shall investigate the two theories viz.
the Austinian and the Searlean separately. Later on it will be necessary to discriminate between criticisms that affect the distinction as made by Austin and those that affect it as made by Searle. This is act austin speech thesis distinction between utterances which are meaningful, which are all thought to be statements of what is or is not the case, and utterances which are meaningless.
This view holds that only statements are ever meaningful. But Austin rejects this pointing to another class of ordinary utterances which are neither meaningless nor constative i.
Prof Rishikant Pandey on J L Austin's Speech Act Theory (Part 1)
, time: 23:48The Discussion On The Theory Of Speech Acts Of Austin
On Austin’s Theory Of Speech Act: Posted on Degree:Master Type:Thesis Country:China Candidate:X Q Feng Full Text:PDF GTID Subject:Logic Abstract/Summary: PDF Full Text Request: The main contribution of Austin to philosophy of language is his theory of speech blogger.com’s thoughts of natural language and common Critique of J. L. Austin’s Speech Act Theory: Decentralization of the Speaker-Centered Meaning in Communication YOSHITAKE Masaki (Fukuoka University of Education) Abstract. The paper examines J. L. Austin’s Speech Act Theory in terms of the dialogical nature of communication and decentralizes the speaker-centered meaning in blogger.com Size: 87KB Let me now turn to Austin's notion of perlocutionary act. Unfortunately, this notion Speech acts have been differently defined and examined. Intention and Communication unpubl. thesis
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